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ABSTRACT 
e-Health Policy faces a radical change of perspective in the development of new e-Health 
projects. Indeed these projects are no more conceived as simple answers to well-identified 
and punctual needs. Today they are part of an Infrastructure Policy aiming at the 
establishment and the operation of real information highways in healthcare. This paper tests 
the creation of these highways against four validity criteria : necessity, transparency, security 
& confidentiality, and quality. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. e-Health is characterized by the use of Information and Communication Technologies 
in healthcare. These technologies have been used in healthcare in many ways for many 
years. 
In a first approach, e-Health is based on a large range of products dedicated to the 
management and the exploitation of information in healthcare. These products are not only 
softwares in computers (1). There are as many products as they are types of information to 
manage and there are as many products as there are applications for which they are 
created. Information concern patients as well as the health practitioners, and information may 
be relative to all aspects of all activities involved in healthcare - such as the provision of 
healthcare, its organisation, control, public or private funding, development of new medical 
devices or medicaments, as well as scientific research. The best-known products are 
electronic medical records. The development of e-Health is even more critical as, for 
decades, there have been more and more accurate medical information available concerning 
the patient in an individual or a collective approach. Scientific progress includes blood 
analysis, genetic engineering, medical imaging, etc. In the same time, medical treatments 
are improving and tend to be less and less invasive.  
                                               
1
  By example they also include softwares in medical devices. 
In a second approach, e-Health is growing based on telematic infrastructures, notably the 
Internet or private telematic networks. The exploitation of these infrastructures in healthcare 
aims at improving the circulation of information to the benefit of all the actors of healthcare, 
such as practitioners, patients, researchers (from university, public or private research 
centres, pharmaceutical or medical devices industries, etc.), public or private bodies 
participating to the funding of healthcare and the quality control of healthcare services, etc. 
These telecommunication infrastructures provide the practitioners with the ability to 
collaborate through a network and to use, share or offer, special e-Health products and 
services. Therefore new platforms are created in view of managing these networks. 
Logically, in this context, beyond information websites in healthcare, these networks give the 
opportunity to new services such as Telemedicine applications, ambulatory devices with 
telecommunication functions, e-Prescription, and all the other applications using new 
Information and Communication Technologies in order to provide assistance tools to medical 
prevention, diagnosis, treatment, monitoring and lifestyle. With respect to this, new tools 
appear such as ICT implants allowing better tele-monitoring or even efficient and effective  
telemedicine insofar they allow direct medical intervention on the human being through 
implant to be considered as terminal .The patient is definitively entering into the circle of 
health telematic networks  
2. These new e-Health products and services are relatively well-known today even if all 
their technical and legal aspects are not fully under control (2). However, e-Health faces now 
radical change of perspective. Indeed, so far, the creation of a telematic network or 
infrastructure was based upon a specific need : the development of a new product or service 
in healthcare. But, today, telematic networks or infrastructure are conceived without direct 
reference to specified purposes. They are created in view of permitting the achievement of 
future purposes that are to be defined in a next step. These telematic networks represent a 
purpose in themselves. They are like highways for vehicles, or like infrastructures for gas, 
electricity or telephone. These new telematic networks or infrastructures are to the products 
and services in healthcare what pylons and antennas are to telephonic products and 
services. We currently witness the birth of new but real information highways in healthcare, in 
their uttermost complete vision.  
In this context, e-Health projects aim to create telematic networks or infrastructure at local, 
regional, national, European, international, or even worldwide level. The establishment and 
the operation of these networks or infrastructures are beyond the usual sphere of influence of 
traditional healthcare actors, and far beyond their traditional activities. Indeed, these 
networks involve more and more technicians, intermediaries, and many other actors such as 
public and private bodies participating to public health policy and social security policy. Many 
motivations may explain for the creation of these networks e.g. in terms of public health, 
patient involvement in healthcare, healthcare funding and control of the quality, scientific 
research, discovery of new medicaments or medical devices. These new telematic networks 
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  Especially in case of international aspects.  
or infrastructures are articulated around the information relative to all healthcare actors, e-
Health products and services and their special infrastructures.  
But, once more, the difference with these new telematic networks or infrastructure, their 
novelty lays in the permanence of their structure regarding their present and future 
exploitations. The opportunity to create such infrastructure is not evaluated anymore in view 
of a single specific purpose to be achieved. Their opportunity is measured in a abstract way 
regarding categories of future purposes which content will be defined later. There is a radical 
change particularly as regards the required precision and materiality to assess the purposes 
of telematic infrastructures and their future exploitations. In other words, these new telematic 
networks are information systems composed of two levels. The first level is the infrastructure 
(generally including shared data bases through the collection and processing of personal 
data – such as identification registries of patients and practitioners). The second level is the 
future purposes to be achieved by means of the infrastructure. Therefore these projects are 
in fact part of a policy aiming to create telematic infrastructures in healthcare. They also 
express a move from vertical organizations in healthcare to abstract, horizontal and 
transversal approaches in a first step and then specific and vertical in a second step. The 
mere existence of these new telematic infrastructure in healthcare will allow for shared 
databases, imply the identification of practitioners and patients through special dedicated 
registries, etc. Eventually, these networks will deeply modify the organization of healthcare. 
Furthermore, all actors in healthcare are involved including healthcare practitioners, social 
security and public Health bodies, laboratories, patients, etc.  
It is not possible to cover all the legal issues raised by these new information highways in this 
contribution. But it seems useful to confront them with four criteria : (I) necessity, (II) 
transparency, (III) security & confidentiality, and (IV) quality.  
I. NECESSITY 
3. When one wishes to create information highways in healthcare, does one need to 
consider its necessity? Should the infrastructure be necessary to justify its creation and 
operation ? From an ethical viewpoint, the question of the necessity to invest in this kind of 
infrastructure is quite mandatory since public and private resources are limited in healthcare. 
Logically, the creation of such information highways should correspond to real but imperative 
social needs. In this respect, necessity should be assessed through multidisciplinary and 
rigorous experimental studies. In Law, the notion of necessity may appear in different ways 
when creating and operating these new infrastructures in healthcare. 
4. The notion of necessity may appear when the infrastructure is considered through the 
prism of the protection of the rights and liberties and especially regarding the right to respect 
for private life (3). Indeed, if a telematic infrastructure in healthcare and its operation may be 
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  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8. 
viewed as an interference (4) by a public authority with the exercise of this right (5), this 
interference, according to article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and according to article 7 of the European Chart of 
Fundamental Rights, should be in accordance with the law (6) and should be, in a democratic 
society, necessary (7) to “(…) the economic well-being of the country (…) for the protection of 
health (…) for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Furthermore the right to 
respect for private life may induce the (positive) obligation for the Member State to adopt 
appropriate measures to ensure the respect for private life in the sphere of the relations of 
individuals between themselves (8). This obligation could lead to the necessity to regulate 
private infrastructures in healthcare. In determining whether or not such positive obligation 
exists, regard must be had to the fair balance which has to be struck between the interest of 
the infrastructure and the interests of the individuals, without prejudice of the margin of 
appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authority (9). 
5. The notion of necessity appears also when telematic infrastructures are considered 
through the norms applicable to the processing of personal data. Indeed, the United Nations 
provide that a file containing personal data should only be created and used for specific and 
justified purposes (10). In the same way, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data provides that personal 
data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes (11). To be legitimate or justified, the 
purpose must comply notably with the test of proportionality (12). The later requires to take 
into account the necessity of the purpose of the infrastructure. In the same way, the notion of 
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  On the notion of interference : E.C.H.R., 27 August 1997, M.S. c. Sweden, §§ 33-35 ; 4 May 
2000, Rotaru c. Romania, § 46. 
5
  On the notion of private life : E.C.H.R., 4 May 2000, Rotaru c. Romania, §§ 42- 43 ; 26 Feb. 
2002, Pretty c. United-Kingdom, § 61 ; 24 June 2004, Von Hannover c. Germany, §§ 50-52, and 61. 
6
  Furthermore, the law must be accessible and foreseeable  (on the latter, see : E.C.H.R., 4 
May 2000, Rotaru c. Romania, § 55). 
7
  The necessity justifies the interference. The notion of necessity implies that the interference 
corresponds to an important social need and in particuliar that the interference should be 
proportionate with its legitimate purpose (E.C.H.R., 26 Feb. 2002, Pretty c. United-Kingdom, § 70). 
The Member States enjoy a margin of appreciation depending on the nature of the issues and the 
importance of the interests at stake (id.). 
8
  E.C.H.R., Von Hannover c. Germany, § 57. 
9
  On the positive obligation and its conditions : E.C.H.R., 7 Feb. 2002, Mikulic c. Croatia, § 58. 
10
  Guidelines concerning competurized personal data files, adopted by the General Assembly on 
14 Dec. 1990 (resolution 45/95).Cf. also article 8 of the European Chart of Fundamental Rights.  
11
  D. 95/46/CE, art. 6.1.b. The Directive provides that further processing of data for historical, 
statistical or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member States 
provide appropriate safeguards (in the same way : . Convention for the protection of individuals with 
regard to automatic processing of personal data, 28 Jan. 1981 (n° 108), art. 5.b). 
12
  The interests in presence are those of data subjects, data controllers, the society and 
interested third parties. 
necessity appears in the principle of minimization of the processing of personal data (13) 
which might be deduced from  the data quality principle (14).  
6. However these new telematic infrastructures cause a particular problem regarding the 
proportionality test. Indeed, since they constitute double-level information systems, the 
necessity of their creation and operating can only evaluated on an abstract base in the first 
place and on a real basis only after their exploitation. Put differently, their necessity will 
appear through their use. That is a risk to take into account at their beginning. This risk is not 
an impossible obstacle to the creation of these new infrastructures in healthcare. But it 
imposes to strength the tools used to control their necessity, according to the safety 
precaution principle. In others words, these new infrastructures require special bodies and 
procedures in order to assess their necessity on a periodical base. With respect to this, this 
constraint is stronger with sensitive data like medical data.  
II. TRANSPARENCY 
7. Should these new telematic infrastructures in healthcare be transparent ? Before 
answering this question, we have to agree on the significance of the “transparency” concept. 
From a general point of view, transparency translates the idea that the data flows generated 
by these telematic infrastructures should be known and accessible to all. They may not be 
secretly created but in a public way. In the same idea, their functioning should be transparent 
and under control. That transparency should be assessed in a collective way in order to 
control human activities, as well as in an individual way to ensure the respect for the rights 
and liberties of all. With respect to this, the characteristics of these new infrastructures in 
healthcare reduce their transparency regarding their operation since the later is not known 
with precision at the beginning but only after their exploitation. On the other hand and 
principally, the transparency of each data processing is not sufficient. The infrastructure has 
to be known in itself, and the multiple data flows it permits should be known as well. 
Regarding the later, the necessity of a data flows’ registry would have to be imposed beyond 
the simple information relative to each data flow considered on an individual base.  
8. Regarding processing of personal data, transparency applies only to the processing 
and is mainly ensured by the information to be given to the data subject concerning the 
processing of his or her personal data, and by the right of access to his or her personal data 
that are processed (15), and by the notification of the data processing to the competent 
supervisory authority (16). Concerning especially the information of the data subject, Directive 
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  Regarding the Minimizing Principle, see: Working Party, First Annual Report, 25 June 1997, 
WP 3, p. 15. In other words, one should minimize the processing of personal data.  
14
  As expressed in article 6.1.c. of Directive 95/46/EC.  
15
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 12. 
16
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 18-21 
95/46/EC makes a difference if the personal data is or not obtained from the data subject (17) 
: 
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;  
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;  
(c) any further information such as 
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data, 
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as 
the possible consequences of failure to reply, 
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data 
concerning him 
in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to the specific 
circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair processing in 
respect of the data subject 
The duty to inform the data subject does not apply, when the data have not been obtained 
from the data subject when, in particular for processing for statistical purposes or for the 
purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of such information proves 
impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure is expressly 
laid down by law. In these cases Member States shall provide appropriate safeguards (18).  
The duty to inform the data subject goes forth in the right of access to his/her personal data 
and in the right to obtain the rectification, erasure or blocking of data in case their processing 
does not comply with the provisions of Directive 95/46/EC, in particular because of the 
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data. With respect to this, the organization of the new 
telematic infrastructures should ease the exercise of the data subject’s rights according to 
the principle of the reciprocity of advantages. When telematic infrastructures facilitate 
collection and processing of personal data, they should consequently provide data subjects 
with direct on-line access to their personal data and to data controllers and other bodies 
involved in the network.  
When carrying special devices with telecommunication functions (such as health cards, ICT 
implants, RFID implants, etc.), the data subject should control them. This control implies the 
transparency of their existence, the ways of their operation, their informational content, and 
the risks induced by the interruption of the service by the patient (19).   
The creation of these new telematic infrastructure raises another question. Who is globally in 
charge of the infrastructure, independently of the determination of the data controller for the 
personal data processing ? The solution to this question should not be delegated as such to 
jurisdictions. Independently from the determination of data controllers, the person in charge 
of the network, “ the network controller “, should be clearly identified. Indeed, only the 
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  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 10. 
18
  Id., art. 11.2. 
19
  See also art. 4.2. of Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications). 
conception and the quality of the network permit to consider the risks relative to the different 
data processing. 
9. When the new telematic infrastructures open the door to new services of the 
information society (20), these later must comply with special requirements in terms of 
transparency. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') provides special rules 
relative to additional general information to be provided (21), commercial communications (22) 
including unsolicited commercial communication (23) from regulated professions (24). The 
Directive provides special rules relative to the information to be provided for the conclusion of 
contracts by electronic means (25) and for the placing of orders (26)  
III. SECURITY & CONFIDENTIALITY 
10. The security and confidentiality of information highways in healthcare are certainly 
more easy notions to understand. These requirements envisage or encompasse both levels 
of the information system. The infrastructure must be secure and stable. It should ensure the 
security and the confidentiality of the data processing performed in the framework of the 
second level.  
Regarding the processing of personal data occurring at both levels, confidentiality implies 
that any person acting under the authority of the controller or of the processor, including the 
processor himself, who has access to personal data, must not process them except on 
instructions from the controller, unless he is required to do so by law (27). Security implies 
that the data controller but also and in due cooperation with the first one, the so called 
“network controller” must implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to 
protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, 
unauthorized disclosure or access, in particular where the processing involves the 
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  As defined in art. 1.2 of Directive 98/34/EC. 
21
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 5. These information concern mainly the identification and the 
localisation  of the service provider.  
22
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 6. 
23
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 7. 
24
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 8. The use of commercial communications which are part of, or 
constitute, an information society service provided by a member of a regulated profession is permitted 
subject to compliance with the professional rules regarding, in particular, the independence, dignity 
and honour of the profession, professional secrecy and fairness towards clients and other members of 
the profession. 
25
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 10. These information concern the technical steps to follow to 
conclude the contract, the storage of the contract, the possibility to identify and correct errors, the 
languages offered for the conclusion of the contract. In the same way, contractual terms and general 
conditions must be made available in a way that allows him to store and reproduce them (there are 
exceptions for contract concluded exclusively by exchange of email or by mean of by equivalent 
individual communications).  
26
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 11. The service provider has to acknowledge the receipt of the 
recipient's order without undue delay and by electronic means. 
27
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 16. 
transmission of data over a network, and against all other unlawful forms of processing (28). 
Having regard to the state of the art and the cost of their implementation, such measures 
shall ensure a level of security appropriate to the risks represented by the processing and the 
nature of the data to be protected (29). When processing is carried out on one’s behalf, the 
data controller as to choose a processor (30) providing sufficient guarantees in respect of the 
technical security measures and organizational measures governing the processing to be 
carried out, and must ensure compliance with those measures (31). It may seem difficult to 
comply with these constraints, especially when these telematic infrastructures imply the 
intervention of providers non-subject to medical deontology or medical secrecy. Sometimes, 
the creation and the operation of these infrastructures may oppose traditional rules relative to 
medical secrecy. But information society technologies may provide many solutions to these 
problems. Directive 2002/58/EC provides rules concerning the security and the confidentiality 
of electronic communications but unfortunately only for infrastructures open to the public and 
accessible to him (32). 
11. Concerning new information society services realized through these new telematic 
infrastructures, Directive 2000/31/EC aims to ensure some legal certainty and consumer 
confidence (33) notably by regulating certain legal aspects of the conclusion of contracts by 
electronic means, when other Directives provides consumers with some protection (34). The 
new products and services that could be offered through new telematic infrastructures in 
healthcare will strengthen the place of the patient in healthcare as a consumer, entitling him 
or her with all the rights (what about the duties ?) subsequent to this qualification.  
IV. QUALITY 
                                               
28
  See also art. 4.2 of Directive 2002/58/EC. 
29
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 17.1. 
30
  The notion of processor is different from the notion of data controller. The processor 
processes personal data in the strict framework of the mission determined by the data controller. He 
may not use the personal data for his own purposes. He must obey to strict confidentiality duties. His 
choice must be based on qualitative criteria. The notion of processor is very important and useful in 
the context of telematic infrastructures and networks in healthcare. This notion helps to qualify the 
function of several technical intermediaries (by example, an enterprise offering storage resources, or 
healthgrid platforms, or secondary providers in case of telemedicine).  
31
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 17.2. Member States have the duty to identify data processing 
presenting particular risks and to check them prior their implementation (Directive 95/46/EC, art.20).  
32
  See art. 4, 5, 6 and 9 of Directive 2002/58/EC. 
33
  Directive 2000/31/EC, recital 7. 
34  Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market; Directive 
2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use; Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of consumers 
in respect of distance contracts; Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees; 
Directive 2001/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety; Council directive 85/374/CE of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products as modified by Directive 1999/34/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
May 1999 amending Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. 
12. Finally, the notion of the quality of the new telematic infrastructures in healthcare is 
essential. First, it raises back the question about the availability of the products and services 
for practitioners and patients (35). It raises back the question of the technical quality of data 
transmission (data integrity). It raises back also the question of the qualification and 
education of all the actors involved in the operation of the information system at both level. 
Regarding the processing of personal data, the right of rectification and the right to oppose 
the processing participate indirectly to the data quality (36). In terms of information society 
services, some special rules contribute to the quality of the system notably when they allow 
for the identification and the correction of input errors prior the placing of the order (37) and 
when they allow for the identification of the service provider (cf. supra n° 7). 
CONCLUSIONS 
13. The first age of e-Health is not yet fully implemented while the healthcare sector is 
already confronted with a radical change in its organization. From a vertical implementation 
of new products and services, we now witness the creation of permanent telematic 
infrastructures and networks in healthcare. These new telematic infrastructures and networks 
raise concerns in terms of necessity, transparency, security & confidentiality, and quality. 
These infrastructures and networks are characterized by their permanency. We will have to 
evaluate their validity “a posteriori” and on a periodical base. The evaluation should take into 
account the interests of the society, of the actors of healthcare, of the patients and of the 
citizens. In order to stimulate the acceptance of such information systems and improve their 
transparency, it seems opportune to implement clearly identified landmarks (bodies and 
procedures) in their creation and functioning by creating what Pierre TRUDEL qualifies as 
“trust circles”, by restricting in the context of these networks and through transparent 
regulatory means ( including self-regulatory ones) the people authorized to act and access to 
certain resources present through the infrastructure. In Belgium, the Federal Be-Health 
Project represents a very good example of such evolution in the organization of Public 
Health. The later aims to offer a public platform and some e-Health products and services, 
notably to the benefit of practitioners and patients.  
But one should not forget that healthcare can not be reduced to machines, devices or 
informatics. First of all, healthcare is a liberal art and, as such, is not completely subject to 
rationalization and to the use of information systems even if their quality and advantages are 
not questionable. Medicine is a combination of personal skills and knowledge. And “chance” 
has always be an important factor regarding the progress of medical knowledge. Then, we 
should be very careful not to trust all our medical knowledge in machines and not to put all 
our money in it. We should also focus on the education of human-minded practitioners. 
Otherwise, we could forget how to progress and how to challenge established knowledge in 
order to progress. ICT in healthcare is a challenge, more than ever, for the worst and the 
best. We should go on trying to exploit the best of it.  
                                               
35
  Directive 95/46/EC, art. 6.1.c and d. 
36
  See also art. 14 of Directive 2002/58/EC, concerning technical features and standardisation. 
37
  Directive 2000/31/EC, art. 10.1.c and art. 11.2. 
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